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the deceased's cabin. Shortly thereafter Williams disappeared. His clothes were found on the bank of the Colorado
River near Crossroads, and his body was recovered from the
river in an identifiable condition. At the trial the testimony given by him at the preliminary hearing was read into
the record.
The foregoing facts constitute evidence which, even though
circumstantial, is substantial enough to have established the
guilt of the two defendants in the minds of the jury.
[2] Defendants contend that the district attorney was
guilty of prejudicial misconduct at the trial in questioning
Reed as to whether or not he had been previously convicted
of a felony. On cross-examination Reed was asked whether
or not he had been convicted of stealing government property and sentenced under that conviction. The court permitted the question over objection by counsel for the defendants, and Reed answered "no". At the conclusion of
the testimony in the case the district attorney stated that
when he had asked the question regarding a prior conviction, he had asked it in good faith, expecting to be able to
prove the conviction by documentary evidence, but that such
evidence was not available, and he therefore requested that
the matter be expunged from the record and the jury instructed to disregard the question. The court complied with
the request. In view of this subsequent statement by the
district attorney, the expunging of the matter from the record
by the court in compliance with the district attorney's request, and the absence of any evidence of bad faith on the
part of the district attorney, there is no prejudicial misconduct requiring a reversal. (People v. Braun, 14 Cal. (2d) 1
[92 Pac. (2d) 402].)
The judgment and order of the trial court are affirmed.

[So F. No. 15969.

Department Two.-February 19, 1941.]

LOUIS A. LONG, Respondent, V. MARGARET C. LONG,
Appellant.
[I] Divorce and Separation-Permanent Alimony-Modification
of Allowance-Effect of Absence of Alimony Provision in Decree.-A court which has provided for alimony payments for
a definite term without reserving the right to change or modify
the term is without power to make further allowance for the
wife's support after such alimony has been paid and the final
decree has been entered.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County, setting aside an order modifying an interlocutory decree of divorce. William F. James, Judge. Affirmed.
David M. Burnett and John M. Burnett for Appellant.'
Henry E. Monroe and Henriette W. Steinegger for Respondent.
:,

TRAYNOR, J.-On January 7, 1930, the Superior Court
of Santa Clara County awarded appellant Margaret C. Long
an interlocutory decree of divorce against respondent Louis
A. Long directing him to pay appellant $50 a month alimony
for the six months from February 5, 1930, to and including
July 5, 1930. This alimony was duly paid. The final decree
of divorce, entered on March 30, 1931, neither awarded alimony to appellant nor reserved to the court jurisdiction
thereafter to make an allowance for appellant's support.
On November 10, 1931, on application of appellant supported
by an affidavit averring that because of injury she was no
longer able to support herself, the court after a hearing made
an order modifying the interlocutory decree of divorce by
requiring respondent to pay $50 a month alimony thenceforth until further order of the court. On December 20,
1. Power to reopen decree of divorce which is silent as to or
expressly provides against alimony so as to permit modification
in that regard, note, 83 A. L. R. 1248. See, also, 1 Cal. Jur. 1035;
17 Am. JUl'. 494.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Divorce and Separation, § 216 (2),
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1935, the court entered an order granting respondent's motion to set aside the order of November 10, 1931, upon the
ground that the attempt to modify the interlocutory decree
of January 7, 1930, was without jurisdiction and void. The
present appeal is taken from this order.
Section 139 of the Civil Code provides: "Where a divorce
is granted for an offense of the husband, the Court may compel him to provide for the maintenance of the children of
the marriage, and to make such suitable allowance to the
wife for her support, during her life or for a shorter period
as the Court may deem just, having regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively; and the Court may from
time to time modify its order in these respects." [1] Appellant, relying on Smith v. Superior Oourt, 89 Cal. App.
177 [264 Pac. 573], and Bechtel v. Bechtel, 124 Cal. App. 617
[12 Pac. (2d) 970], contends that the above section confers on
the court an express power to modify an alimony decree even
though the alimony was awarded for a limited time, which
has expired, and the decree did not contain a reservation of
jurisdiction.
This contention is answered adversely and the authorities
relied on are distinguished in Tolle v. Superior Oourt, 10 Cal.
(2d) 95 [73 Pac. (2d) 607], which holds that if the court
provides for alimony payments for a definite term without reserving the right to change or modify the term, the court has
no power to make further allowance for the wife's support
after such alimony has been paid and the final decree has
been entered.
The order is affirmed.
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THE S. A. GERRARD COMPANY ea Corporation) et al.,
Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION, MACERIO VALDEZ et al., Respondents.
[1] Independent Contractors-Introductory-Deiinitions.-An in-

dependent contractor is one who renders service in the course
of an independent employment or occupation, following his
employer's desires only in the result of the work, and not the
means whereby it is to be accomplished.
[2] Id. - Existence of Relationship - Supervision of Work by
Owner and Factor.-The relationship of the employer and employee exists whenever the employer obtains the right to direct
how the work shall be done as well as the results to be accomplished, that is to say, when he retains the right to exercise complete or authoritative control, rather than the right
to make mere suggestions as to detail. It is the right to
control, rather than the amount of control exercised, that is
the determinative factor.
[3] Workmen's Compensation-Certiorari-Findings on Conflicting Evidence-Relationship of Employer and Employee.-If
there is a substantial conflict in the evidence regarding the
status as employee of the person claiming compensation, the
finding of the Industrial Accident Commission will not be disturbed.
[4] Id.-Persons Entitled to Compensation-Employees-Persons
Embraced by Terms - In General- Cropper. - Where one
leased land for the purpose of growing melons and under
a contract with the lessor was to plant and pick the crop
in accordance with the latter's direction, and where the
latter's right of control of operations extended to all the
persons who worked in picking and raising the crops, the
lessee, though in form an independent contractor, was in effect
an employee.

~

Curtis, J., and Houser, J., concurred..

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation for personal injuries. Award affirmed.
1. Circumstances under which existence of relationship of employer and independent contract is predicable, note, 19 A. L. R.
1168. See, also, 27 Cal. Jur. 283; 28 R. C. L. 762.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Independent Contractors, § 1; 2. Independent Contractors, § 6; 3. Workmen's Compensation, § 273
(3); 4. Workmen's Compensation, § 41 (1).
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